

Verifying the Mathematical Library of a UAV Autopilot with Frama-C

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Formal methods

- Verification techniques based on mathematical models
- Recommended in avionics with DO-178C and DO-333 standards
- Example: abstract interpretation, deductive methods, model-checking

The goals of this ongoing work

- Define verification processes that use formal methods,
- Apply these methods to a drone autopilot: Paparazzi.

Analysis of a mathematical library of Paparazzi:

- Using Frama-C,
- Checking for the absence of runtime errors,
- Verification of some functional properties,
- Without modifying the code.

Frama-C



Software Analyzers

Frama-C is a C code analysis tool

- Developed by CEA and Inria,
- Modular, which supports different analysis methods
ex: static analysis with EVA or dynamic analysis with E-ACSL.

Verification process of a C program using Frama-C:

1. Code specification with **ACSL** (*ANSI C Specification Language*),
2. Generation of the abstract syntax tree of the analyzed code,
3. Analysis of the tree by the plugins
⇒ Verify if the specification is respected.

Note: the tree analysis can be performed by several plugins.

RTE (*RunTime Errors*):

- Adds assertions in the code,
- Allows to verify runtime errors
ex: division by 0, overflows ...

WP (*Weakest Precondition*)

- Implements weakest precondition calculus,
- Interfaced with Why3 to verify goals with automatic provers (Alt-Ergo, Z3, CVC4).

EVA (*Evolved Value Analysis*)

- Based on static analysis by abstract interpretation methods,
- Computes domains of values for each variable in the program.

Paparazzi

Paparazzi is an autopilot for micro-drones


- Developed at ENAC since 2003,
- Open-Source under GPL license.



Complete drone control system:

- Offers the control software part,
- Also offers some designs of hardware components,
- Supports for ground and aerial vehicles,
- Supports for simultaneous control of several drones.

Flight system architecture



`pprz_algebra` : mathematical algebra library coded in C ($\sim 4\,000$ loc)

The library contains:

- The definition of a representation of vectors,
- Different representations of vector rotations, *rotation matrices, Euler angles, quaternions*
- Elementary operations, *ex: addition of vectors, computation of the rotation of a vector, normalization of a quaternion . . .*
- Conversion functions between these different representations.

Note: Each representation/function has a fixed point (`int`) and floating-point version (for `float` and `double`).

Absence of runtime errors

Absence of runtime errors

There are different types of runtime errors:

- Dereferencing an invalid pointer,
- Division by 0,
- Overflows,
- Non finite float value,
- ...

Goals: To determine the minimum contracts for the functions of the library in order to guarantee the absence of runtime errors.

Process :

- Analyze the code with Frama-C using RTE and WP plugins.
- Deduce the missing information in the contract.

Analysis of the instruction:

```
c->x = a->x * b->x;
```

Frama-C finds 2 potential errors!

- Pointers might not be valid.

```
• /*@ assert rte: mem_access: \valid(&c->x); */  
• /*@ assert rte: mem_access: \valid_read(&a->x); */  
• /*@ assert rte: mem_access: \valid_read(&b->x); */
```

⇒ Require the validity of pointers as a precondition.

- The values are not bounded.

```
• /*@ assert rte: signed_overflow: -2147483648 ≤ a->x * b->x; */  
• /*@ assert rte: signed_overflow: a->x * b->x ≤ 2147483647; */
```

⇒ Determine bounds which guarantee the absence of overflows.

Example of final contract for the function `int32_quat_comp`

```
#define SQRT_INT_MAX4 23170 // 23170 = SQRT(INT_MAX/4)

/*@
  requires \valid(a2c);
  requires \valid_read(a2b);
  requires \valid_read(b2c);
  requires bound_Int32Quat(a2b, SQRT_INT_MAX4);
  requires bound_Int32Quat(b2c, SQRT_INT_MAX4);
  requires \separated(a2c, a2b) && \separated(a2c, b2c);
  assigns *a2c;
*/
void int32_quat_comp(struct Int32Quat *a2c,
                    struct Int32Quat *a2b,
                    struct Int32Quat *b2c)
```

EVA and WP had to be associated to verify the absence of RTE.

- WP is overloaded when accessing values by reference,
- EVA cannot verify loop variants and invariants.

⇒ The same problem has been raised in the thesis of V. Todorov.

The real **arithmetic model** (real in the mathematical sense) has been used to verify floating-point version of the functions.

The real model guarantees :

- The absence of division by 0,
- The lack of dereference of invalid pointers.

But the absence of overflows is not verified.

Functional verification

Functional verification

Offer guarantees on the behavior or the result of a function.

Example: *Functional properties for square root function*

```
/*@  
  requires x >= 0;  
  ensures \result >= 0;  
  ensures \result * \result == \old(x);  
  assigns \nothing;  
*/  
float sqrt(float x);
```

Note : Verifying these properties is only possible with the *real* model.

The functional verification was only done for some floating-point functions.

How to specify the functional properties?

Functional properties must be expressed in the ACSL logic.

First, it is necessary to define:

- **Types**,
ex : RealVect3, RealRMat, RealQuat.
- **Elementary functions**,
ex: addition of vectors, rotation of a vector...
- **Conversion functions** between certain representations,
ex: Definition of the function $rmat_of_quat : \mathbb{H} \rightarrow M_{3,3}(\mathbb{R})$,

```
/*@  
  logic RealRMat l_RMat_of_FloatQuat(struct FloatQuat *q) =  
    [...]  
*/
```

- **Lemmas...**

Lemmas: Verify that the mathematical definitions are correct.

Ex: The conversion function produces the same rotation,

- Mathematically,

$$\forall q \in \mathbb{H}, \forall v \in \mathbb{R}^3, \quad q(0, v)q^* = (0, \text{rmat_of_quat}(q).v)$$

Finally, the functional properties are expressed in the form of predicates:

- M is a rotation matrix: $M.M^t = I$
- ...

Spécification of the function `float_rmat_of_quat`.

```
/*@  
    requires \valid(rm);  
    requires \valid_read(q) && finite_FloatQuat(q);  
    requires unitary_quaternion(q);  
    requires \separated(rm, q);  
    ensures rotation_matrix(l_RMat_of_FloatRMat(rm));  
    ensures special_orthogonal(l_RMat_of_FloatRMat(rm));  
    ensures l_RMat_of_FloatRMat(rm) == l_RMat_of_FloatQuat(q);  
    assigns *rm;  
*/  
void float_rmat_of_quat(struct FloatRMat *rm,  
                       struct FloatQuat *q)
```

Contracts of the trigonometric functions from the libc do not provide mathematical results.

⇒ Extend the contracts.

ex: Extension of the contract for the function `sinf`.

```
/*@ requires finite_arg: \is_finite(x);
    assigns \result \from x;
    ensures finite_result: \is_finite(\result);
    ensures result_domain: -1. <= \result <= 1.;
    ensures result_value: \result == \sin(x);
*/
extern float sinf(float x);
```

Some lemmas could not be proved by the SMT solvers.

⇒ Enable interactive mode of Frama-C to use Coq.

Summary of the functional verification

Functional verification offers guarantees on the behavior of a function.

- Functional properties are expressed using ACSL.
- The verification can be done automatically or interactively.

Using the real model:

- Offers no functional guarantee during execution.
- Used to verify that the code is correct in a mathematical sense,

Conclusion

Summary :

- Verification of the absence of runtime errors in the library,
- Verification of functional properties on some floating-point functions.

⇒ Approximately 3,500 lines of annotation.

`gitlab.isae-supaero.fr/b.pollien/paparazzi-frama-c`

Perspectives:

- Verification of calls to library functions,
- Verifying the floating-point library without the `real` model,
- Verifying the Paparazzi flight plan generator.

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Thank you



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Examples of lemmas proved with Coq

- Lemma to verify the correctness of the function `quat_of_rmat`

$$\forall R \in SO_3(\mathbb{R}), \forall q \in \mathbb{H},$$

$$\|q\| > 0 \wedge \text{Tr}(R) > 0$$

$$\rightarrow (R = \text{rmat_of_quat}(q) \leftrightarrow q = \text{quat_of_rmat}(R))$$

- Lemma used to verify that `rmat_of_euler` compute rotation matrix:

$$\forall a, b, c \in \mathbb{R},$$

$$\sin(a)^2 \cos(b)^2$$

$$+ (\sin(a) \sin(b) \cos(c) - \sin(c) \cos(a))^2$$

$$+ (\cos(c) \cos(a) + \sin(a) \sin(b) \sin(c))^2 = 1$$